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Couple of more induction proofs.



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Stable Marriage.

## Some quibbles.

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In some sense, the natural numbers.

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Slight differences: showed for all  $n \geq 16$  that  $\bigwedge_{i=4}^{n-1} P(i) \implies P(n)$ .

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Hmmm... It better be that any sum is *strictly less than 2*.

How much less? At least by  $\frac{1}{(k+1)^2}$  for  $S_k$ .

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How should they be matched?

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# The best laid plans..

Consider the pairs..

- ▶ (Anthony) Davis and Pelicans
- ▶ (Lonzo) Ball and Lakers

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Uh..oh.

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Uh..oh. Sad Lonzo and Pelicans.

So..

Produce a pairing where there is no crazy moves!



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**Definition:** A **pairing** is disjoint set of  $n$  job-candidate pairs.

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Example: A pairing  $S = \{(Lakers, Ball); (Pelicans, Davis)\}$ .

**Definition:** A **rogue couple**  $b, g^*$  for a pairing  $S$ :  
 $b$  and  $g^*$  prefer each other to their partners in  $S$

Example: Davis and Lakers are a rogue couple in  $S$ .

# A stable pairing??

Given a set of preferences.

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Is there a stable pairing?

How does one find it?

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Consider a single type version: stable roommates.

A	B	C	D
B	C	A	D
C	A	B	D
D	A	B	C



# A stable pairing??


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
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
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
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
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
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
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## Example.

	Jobs		
A	1	2	3
B	1	2	3
C	2	1	3

	Candidates		
1	C	A	B
2	A	B	C
3	A	C	B

## Example.

	Jobs				Candidates		
A	1	2	3	1	C	A	B
B	1	2	3	2	A	B	C
C	2	1	3	3	A	C	B

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
1					
2					
3					

## Example.

	Jobs				Candidates		
A	1	2	3	1	C	A	B
B	1	2	3	2	A	B	C
C	2	1	3	3	A	C	B

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
1	A, B				
2	C				
3					

# Example.

	Jobs				Candidates		
A	1	2	3	1	C	A	B
B	X	2	3	2	A	B	C
C	2	1	3	3	A	C	B

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
1	A, <del>B</del>				
2	C				
3					

# Example.

	Jobs				Candidates		
A	1	2	3	1	C	A	B
B	X	2	3	2	A	B	C
C	2	1	3	3	A	C	B

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
1	A, <del>B</del>	A			
2	C	B, C			
3					

# Example.

Jobs				Candidates			
A	1	2	3	1	C	A	B
B	<del>X</del>	2	3	2	A	B	C
C	<del>X</del>	1	3	3	A	C	B

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
1	A, <del>B</del>	A			
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3					



# Example.

Jobs				Candidates			
A	1	2	3	1	C	A	B
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	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
1	A, <del>B</del>	A	A, C		
2	C	B, <del>A</del>	B		
3					

# Example.

Jobs				Candidates			
A	<del>X</del>	2	3	1	C	A	B
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C	<del>X</del>	1	3	3	A	C	B

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
1	A, <del>B</del>	A	<del>X</del> , C		
2	C	B, <del>C</del>	B		
3					

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2	C	B, <del>C</del>	B	A, B	
3					

# Example.

Jobs				Candidates			
A	<del>X</del>	2	3	1	C	A	B
B	<del>X</del>	<del>2</del>	3	2	A	B	C
C	<del>2</del>	1	3	3	A	C	B

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
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2	C	B, <del>C</del>	B	A, <del>B</del>	
3					

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Jobs				Candidates			
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	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
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2	C	B, <del>C</del>	B	A, <del>B</del>	A
3					B

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Jobs				Candidates			
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2	C	B, <del>C</del>	B	A, <del>B</del>	A
3					B

Termination.

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Every non-terminated day a job **crossed** an item off the list.



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Terminates in  $\leq n^2$  steps!

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Proof Idea: She can always keep the previous job on the string.

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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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**Claim:** The optimal partner for a job must be first in its preference list.

True? False? False!

Subtlety here: Best partner in any **stable** pairing.

As well as you can be in a globally stable solution!

**Question:** Is there a job or candidate optimal pairing?

Is it possible:

$b$ -optimal pairing different from the  $b'$ -optimal pairing!

Yes?



## Good for jobs? candidates?

Is the Job-Proposes better for jobs? for candidates?

**Definition:** A **pairing is  $x$ -optimal** if  $x$ 's partner is its best partner in any **stable** pairing.

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## Understanding Optimality: by example.

A:	1,2	1:	A,B
B:	1,2	2:	B,A

## Understanding Optimality: by example.

A: 1,2            1: A,B

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Consider pairing:  $(A, 1), (B, 2)$ .

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Optimal for  $B$ ?

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So this is the best  $B$  can do in a stable pairing.

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A: 1,2            1: B,A

B: 2,1            2: A,B

Pairing  $S$ :  $(A, 1), (B, 2)$ .    Stable? Yes.

Pairing  $T$ :  $(A, 2), (B, 1)$ .

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Which is optimal for  $A$ ?

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Which is optimal for 1?



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# Job Propose and Candidate Reject is optimal!

For jobs?

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Notes:

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Structural statement: Job optimality

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Structural statement: Job optimality  $\implies$  Candidate pessimality.

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