Climb an infinite ladder?

∀k, P(k) \implies P(k+1)

P(0) \implies P(1) \implies P(2) \implies P(3) \ldots

(\forall n \in \mathbb{N}) P(n)

Your favorite example of forever..or the natural numbers...
Sad Islanders...

Island with 100 possibly blue-eyed and green-eyed inhabitants.

Any islander who knows they have green eyes must “leave the island” that day.

No islander knows their own eye color, but knows everyone else’s.

All islanders have green eyes!

First rule of island: Don’t talk about eye color!

Visitor: “I see someone has green eyes.”

Result: What happens?
(A) Nothing, no information was added.
(B) Information was added, maybe?
(C) They all leave the island.
(D) They all leave the island on day 100.

On day 100, they all leave.

Why?
They know induction.

Thm: If there are \( n \) villagers with green eyes they leave on day \( n \).

**Proof:**

Base: \( n = 1 \). Person with green eyes leaves on day 1.

Induction hypothesis:

If \( n \) people with green eyes, they would leave on day \( n \).

Induction step:

On day \( n + 1 \), a green eyed person sees \( n \) people with green eyes.

But they didn’t leave.

So there must be \( n + 1 \) people with green eyes.

One of them, is me.

I have to leave the island. I like the island. SAD.

Wait! Visitor added no information.
Quick Poll.

If 66 villagers out of the 100 had green eyes, what would happen?

(A) Everyone would leave on the first day.
(B) The villagers with green eyes would leave on the 66th day.
(C) All the villagers would leave on the 66th day.
(D) The green eyed villagers would leave on the 100th day.
(E) All the villagers would leave on the 100th day.

(B)
Common Knowledge.

Using knowledge about what other people’s knowledge (your eye color) is.

On day 1, everyone knows everyone sees more than zero.
On day 2, everyone knows everyone sees more than one.

... 

On day 99, everyone knows no one sees 98 
  since everyone knows everyone else does not see 97...

On day 100, ...uh oh!

Another example:
Emperor’s new clothes!
  No one knows other people see that he has no clothes.
  Until kid points it out.

Political arguments?
  Everyone knows the arguments,
  everyone knows everyone knows the arguments.....
The islanders didn’t talk. Induction is quieter.
Strong Induction and Recursion.

Thm: For every natural number $n \geq 12$, $n = 4x + 5y$.

Instead of proof, let’s write some code!

```python
def find-x-y(n):
    if (n==12) return (3,0)
    elif (n==13): return(2,1)
    elif (n==14): return(1,2)
    elif (n==15): return(0,3)
    else:
        (x',y') = find-x-y(n-4)
        return (x'+1,y')
```

Prove: Given $n$, returns $(x,y)$ where $n = 4x + 5y$, for $n \geq 12$.


Strong Induction step:

Recursive call is correct: $P(n-4) \implies P(n)$.

$n - 4 = 4x' + 5y' \implies n = 4(x' + 1) + 5(y')$

Slight differences: showed for all $n \geq 16$ that $\land_{i=4}^{n-1} P(i) \implies P(n)$.
Tidying up induction.

The induction principle works on the natural numbers.
Proves statements of form: $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, P(n)$.

Yes.

What if the statement is only for $n \geq 3$?

$$\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, (n \geq 3) \implies P(n)$$

Restate as:

$$\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, Q(n)$$

where $Q(n) = "(n \geq 3) \implies P(n)"$.

Base Case: typically start at 3.

Since $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, Q(n) \implies Q(n + 1)$ is trivially true before 3.

Can you do induction over other things? Yes.

Any set where any subset of the set has a smallest element.

In some sense, the natural numbers.
Stable Matching Problem

- $n$ candidates and $n$ jobs.
- Each job has a ranked preference list of candidates.
- Each candidate has a ranked preference list of jobs.

How should they be matched?
- Maximize total satisfaction.
- Maximize number of first choices.
- Maximize worse off.
- Minimize difference between preference ranks.
The best laid plans..

Consider the pairs..
- Cal Bears and the Pac-12
- Wake Forest and the ACC

Cal Bears prefers the ACC
The ACC prefers Cal Bears.
Uh..oh. Sad Pac-12, (and Wake Forest.)
So..

Produce a matching where there are no crazy moves!

**Definition:** A matching is disjoint set of $n$ job-candidate pairs.

Example: A matching $S = \{(\text{CalBears}, \text{Pac} - 12); (\text{WakeForest}, \text{ACC})\}$.

**Definition:** A rogue couple $b, g^*$ for a pairing $S$: $b$ and $g^*$ prefer each other to their partners in $S$

Example: Cal Bears and the ACC are a rogue couple in $S$.

Not a great example of stable matching, but interesting exercise in “selfish” incentives.
A stable matching??

Given a set of preferences.
Is there a stable matching?
How does one find it?

Consider a single type version: stable roommates.

```
   A | B  C  D 
   B | C  A  D 
   C | A  B  D 
   D | A  B  C 
```
The Propose and Reject Algorithm.

Each Day:

1. Each job proposes to its favorite candidate on its list.
2. Each candidate rejects all but their favorite proposer (whom they put on a string.)
3. Rejected job crosses rejecting candidate off its list.

Stop when each job gets exactly one proposal.
Example.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
<th>Day 4</th>
<th>Day 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>X, C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B, C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Propose and Reject Algorithm.

Each Day:

1. Each job proposes to its favorite candidate on its list.
2. Each candidate rejects all but their favorite proposer (whom they put on a string.)
3. Rejected job crosses rejecting candidate off its list.

Stop when each job gets exactly one proposal.
Does this terminate?

...produce a matching?

....a stable matching?

Do jobs or candidates do “better”?
Termination.

Every non-terminated day a job crossed an item off the list.
Total size of lists? $n$ jobs, $n$ length list. $n^2$
Terminates in $\leq n^2$ steps!
It gets better every day for candidates.

**Improvement Lemma: It just gets better for candidates**

If on day $t$ a candidate $g$ has a job $b$ on a string, any job, $b'$, on candidate $g$'s string for any day $t' > t$ is at least as good as $b$.

Example: Candidate “Alice” has job “Amalmagated Concrete” on string on day 5.

She has job “Amalmagated Asphalt” on string on day 7.

Does Alice prefer “Amalmagated Asphalt” or “Amalmagated Concrete”?

$g$ - ’Alice’, $b$ - ’Am. Con.’, $b'$ - ’Am. Asph.’, $t = 5$, $t' = 7$.

Improvement Lemma says she prefers ’Amalmagated Asphalt’.

Day 10: Can Alice have “Amalmagated Asphalt” on her string? Yes.

Alice prefers day 10 job as much as day 7 job. Here, $b = b'$.

Why is lemma true?

**Proof Idea:** She can always keep the previous job on the string.
Improvement Lemma

Improvement Lemma: It just gets better for candidates.

If on day $t$ a candidate $g$ has a job $b$ on a string, any job, $b'$, on $g$'s string for any day $t' > t$ is at least as good as $b$.

Proof:

$P(k)$ - “job on $g$’s string is at least as good as $b$ on day $t + k$”

$P(0)$ – true. Candidate has $b$ on string.

Assume $P(k)$. Let $b'$ be job on string on day $t + k$.

On day $t + k + 1$, job $b'$ comes back.

Candidate $g$ can choose $b'$, or do better with another job, $b''$

That is, $b' \geq b$ by induction hypothesis.

And $b''$ is better than $b'$ by algorithm.

$\implies$ Candidate does at least as well as with $b$.

$P(k) \implies P(k + 1)$.

And by principle of induction, lemma holds for every day after $t$. \qed
Question: It just gets better for candidates,

(A) By induction on days.

(B) When the economy is good.

(C) The candidate can always keep the job on the string.

(A) and (C).

Sure on (B), but that’s Econ not CS.

To be sure, stable matching is from Econ. Professor’s: Gale and Shapley.

Economics: Study of choice.
Lemma: Every job is matched at end.

Proof:
If not, a job \( b \) must have been rejected \( n \) times.
Every candidate has been proposed to by \( b \), and Improvement lemma

\[ \implies \text{each candidate has a job on a string.} \]
and each job is on at most one string.

\( n \) candidates and \( n \) jobs. Same number of each.

\[ \implies b \text{ must be on some candidate's string!} \]
Contradiction.
Poll: The argument for termination ...

(A) Implies: no unmatched job at end.
(B) Uses Improvement Lemma: every candidate matched.
(C) From Algorithm: unmatched job would ask everyone.
(D) Implies: every one gets their favorite job.
Matching is Stable.

**Lemma:** There is no rogue couple for the matching formed by traditional marriage algorithm.

**Proof:**
Assume there is a rogue couple; \((b, g^*)\)

\[
\begin{align*}
  b^* & \leftrightarrow g^* \quad b \text{ prefers } g^* \text{ to } g. \\
  b & \leftrightarrow g \quad g^* \text{ prefers } b \text{ to } b^*.
\end{align*}
\]

Job \(b\) proposes to \(g^*\) before proposing to \(g\).
So \(g^*\) rejected \(b\) (since he moved on)
By improvement lemma, \(g^* \text{ prefers } b^* \text{ to } b\).
Contradiction!
Question: Proof of Job Propose and Reject a stable pairing uses?

(A) Contradiction.

(B) Uses the improvement lemma.

(C) Induction.

(D) Direct.

(E) The algorithm description.

(A), (B), (C), (E). (Maybe (D) internally. Semantics.)
Good for jobs? candidates?

Is the Job-Proposes better for jobs? for candidates?

**Definition:** A matching is **x-optimal** if x’s partner is its best partner in any **stable** pairing.

**Definition:** A matching is **x-pessimal** if x’s partner is its worst partner in any **stable** pairing.

**Definition:** A matching is **job optimal** if it is x-optimal for **all** jobs x.

..and so on for job pessimal, candidate optimal, candidate pessimal.

**Claim:** The optimal partner for a job must be first in its preference list.

True? False? False!

Subtlety here: Best partner in any **stable** matching. As well as you can be in a globally stable solution!

**Question:** Is there a job or candidate optimal matching?

Is it possible:

- **b-optimal** pairing different from the **b’-optimal** matching!

Yes? No?
Understanding Optimality: by example.

Consider pairing: \((A,1), (B,2)\).

Stable? Yes.

Optimal for \(B\)?

Notice: only one stable pairing. If \((A,2)\) are pair, \((A,1)\) is rogue couple.

So this is the best \(B\) can do in a stable pairing.

So optimal for \(B\).

Also optimal for \(A\), 1 and 2. Also pessimal for \(A,B,1\) and 2.

Pairing \(S\): \((A,1), (B,2)\). Stable? Yes.

Pairing \(T\): \((A,2), (B,1)\). Also Stable.

Which is optimal for \(A\)? \(S\)
Which is optimal for \(B\)? \(S\)
Which is optimal for 1? \(T\)
Which is optimal for 2? \(T\)

Pessimality?
Job Propose and Candidate Reject is optimal!

For jobs? For candidates?

**Theorem:** Job Propose and Reject produces a job-optimal pairing.

**Proof:**
Assume not: a job $b$ is not paired with optimal candidate, $g$.

There is a stable pairing $S$ where $b$ and $g$ are paired.

Let $t$ be first day job $b$ gets rejected by its optimal candidate $g$ who it is paired with in stable pairing $S$.

$b^*$ - knocks $b$ off of $g$’s string on day $t \implies g$ prefers $b^*$ to $b$

By choice of $t$, $b^*$ likes $g$ at least as much as optimal candidate.

$\implies b^*$ prefers $g$ to its partner $g^*$ in $S$.

Rogue couple for $S$.
So $S$ is not a stable pairing. Contradiction.

Notes: $S$ - stable. $(b^*, g^*) \in S$. But $(b^*, g)$ is rogue couple!

Used Well-Ordering principle...Induction.
How about for candidates?

**Theorem:** Job Propose and Reject produces candidate-pessimal pairing.

$T$ – pairing produced by JPR.

$S$ – worse stable pairing for candidate $g$.

In $T$, $(g, b)$ is pair.

In $S$, $(g, b^*)$ is pair.

$g$ prefers $b$ to $b^*$.

$T$ is job optimal, so $b$ prefers $g$ to its partner in $S$.

$(g, b)$ is Rogue couple for $S$.

$S$ is not stable.

Contradiction.

Notes: Not really induction.

Structural statement: Job optimality $\implies$ Candidate pessimality.
Quick Questions.

How does one make it better for candidates?

Propose and Reject - stable matching algorithm. One side proposes.

Jobs Propose $\implies$ job optimal.

Candidates propose. $\implies$ optimal for candidates.
Residency Matching..

The method was used to match residents to hospitals.
Hospital optimal....
..until 1990’s...Resident optimal.
Another variation: couples.
Takeaways.

Analysis of cool algorithm with interesting goal: stability.
“Economic”: different utilities.
Definition of optimality: best utility in stable world.
Action gives better results for individuals but gives instability.
Induction over steps of algorithm.
Proofs carefully use definition:
  Stability:
    Improvement Lemma plus every day the job gets to choose.
  Optimality proof:
    Job Optimality:
      contradiction of the existence of a better stable pairing.
      that is, no rogue couple by improvement, job choice, and well
      ordering principle.
    Candidate Pessimality:
      contradiction plus cuz job optimality implies better pairing.

Life Lesson: ask, you will do better even if rejection is hard.