Do you remember the first lecture?

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Veritassium on Khan

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


Fig. 1. Final recall (a) after repeatedly studying a text in four study periods (SSSS condition), reading a text in one study period and then recalling it in one retrieval period (SSSR condition), or reading a text in one study period and then repeatedly recalling it in three retrieval periods (SRRR condition). Judgments of learning (b) were made on a 7-point scale, where 7 indicated that students believed they would remember material very well. The data presented in these graphs are adapted from Experiment 2 of Reedger and Karpicke (2006b). The pattern of students' metacognitive judgments of learning (predicted recall) was exactly the opposite of the pattern of students' actual long-term retention.

CS70: Lecture 9. Outline.

- 1. Public Key Cryptography
- 2. RSA system
 - 2.1 Efficiency: Repeated Squaring.
 - 2.2 Correctness: Fermat's Theorem.
 - 2.3 Construction.
- 3. Warnings.

My love is won.

My love is won. Zero and One.

My love is won. Zero and One. Nothing and nothing done.

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Find $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$

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Find $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$ where gcd(m, n) = 1.

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Find $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$ where gcd(m, n)=1.

CRT Thm: There is a unique solution $x \pmod{mn}$.

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Find $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$ where gcd(m, n)=1.

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Proof (solution exists):

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Proof (solution exists):

Consider $u = n(n^{-1} \pmod{m})$.

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Find x = a \pmod{m} and x = b \pmod{n} where gcd(m, n)=1.
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Consider u = n(n^{-1} \pmod{m}).

u = 0 \pmod{n} u = 1 \pmod{m}

Consider v = m(m^{-1} \pmod{n}).
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Consider u = n(n^{-1} \pmod{m}).

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Consider v = m(m^{-1} \pmod{n}).

v = 1 \pmod{n} v = 0 \pmod{m}
```

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Consider u = n(n^{-1} \pmod{m}).

u = 0 \pmod{n} u = 1 \pmod{m}

Consider v = m(m^{-1} \pmod{n}).

v = 1 \pmod{n} v = 0 \pmod{m}

Let x = au + bv.
```

My love is won. Zero and One. Nothing and nothing done.

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Find x = a \pmod{m} and x = b \pmod{n} where gcd(m, n)=1.
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v = 1 \pmod{n} v = 0 \pmod{m}

Let x = au + bv.

x = a \pmod{m}
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CRT Thm: There is a unique solution $x \pmod{mn}$.

```
Proof (solution exists):
```

```
Consider u = n(n^{-1} \pmod m).

u = 0 \pmod n u = 1 \pmod m

Consider v = m(m^{-1} \pmod n).

v = 1 \pmod n v = 0 \pmod m

Let x = au + bv.

x = a \pmod m since bv = 0 \pmod m and au = a \pmod m
```

```
My love is won. Zero and One. Nothing and nothing done. Find x = a \pmod{m} and x = b \pmod{n} where \gcd(m, n) = 1. CRT Thm: There is a unique solution x \pmod{mn}. Proof (solution exists): Consider u = n(n^{-1} \pmod{m}). u = 0 \pmod{n} u = 1 \pmod{m} Consider v = m(m^{-1} \pmod{n}). v = 1 \pmod{n} v = 0 \pmod{m} Let x = au + bv.
```

 $x = a \pmod{m}$ since $bv = 0 \pmod{m}$ and $au = a \pmod{m}$

 $x = b \pmod{n}$

My love is won. Zero and One. Nothing and nothing done.

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Find x = a \pmod{m} and x = b \pmod{n} where gcd(m, n) = 1.

CRT Thm: There is a unique solution x \pmod{mn}.

Proof (solution exists):

Consider u = n(n^{-1} \pmod{m}).

u = 0 \pmod{n} u = 1 \pmod{m}

Consider v = m(m^{-1} \pmod{n}).

v = 1 \pmod{n} v = 0 \pmod{m}

Let x = au + bv.

x = a \pmod{m} since bv = 0 \pmod{m} and au = a \pmod{m}
```

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Consider v = m(m^{-1} \pmod{n}).

v = 1 \pmod{n} v = 0 \pmod{m}

Let x = au + bv.

x = a \pmod{m} since bv = 0 \pmod{m} and au = a \pmod{m}

x = b \pmod{n} since au = 0 \pmod{n} and bv = b \pmod{n}
```

```
My love is won. Zero and One. Nothing and nothing done.
```

```
Find x = a \pmod m and x = b \pmod n where \gcd(m, n) = 1.

CRT Thm: There is a unique solution x \pmod mn.

Proof (solution exists):

Consider u = n(n^{-1} \pmod m).

u = 0 \pmod n u = 1 \pmod m

Consider v = m(m^{-1} \pmod n).

v = 1 \pmod n v = 0 \pmod m

Let v = au + bv.

v = a \pmod m since v = b \pmod m and v = b \pmod m

v = b \pmod n since v = b \pmod n and v = b \pmod n

This shows there is a solution.
```

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 $\gcd(m,n) = 1 \implies \text{no common primes in factorization } m \text{ and } n$
 $\implies mn|(x-y)$
 $\implies x-y \ge mn$

Simple Chinese Remainder Theorem.

CRT Thm: There is a unique solution $x \pmod{mn}$.

Proof (uniqueness):

If not, two solutions, x and y.

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 $\implies x-y \ge mn \implies x,y \notin \{1,\ldots,mn-1\}.$
 $(\text{e.g., } m=2,n=5,x,y\in\{1,\ldots,9\} \implies x-y<10.)$

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Thus, only one solution modulo *mn*.

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Thus, only one solution modulo *mn*.

Bijection:

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$$f(x) = ax \pmod{m}$$
 if $gcd(a, m) = 1$.

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Simplified Chinese Remainder Theorem:

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If gcd(n,m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

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If gcd(n,m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

Bijection between $(a \pmod{n}, b \pmod{m})$ and $x \pmod{mn}$.

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Bijection between $(a \pmod{n}, b \pmod{m})$ and $x \pmod{mn}$.

Consider m = 5, n = 9, then if (a, b) = (3, 7) then $x = 43 \pmod{45}$.

Bijection:

$$f(x) = ax \pmod{m}$$
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Bijection between $(a \pmod{n}, b \pmod{m})$ and $x \pmod{mn}$.

Consider m = 5, n = 9, then if (a, b) = (3, 7) then $x = 43 \pmod{45}$.

Consider (a',b') = (2,4), then $x = 22 \pmod{45}$.

Bijection:

$$f(x) = ax \pmod{m}$$
 if $gcd(a, m) = 1$.

Simplified Chinese Remainder Theorem:

If gcd(n, m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

Bijection between $(a \pmod{n}, b \pmod{m})$ and $x \pmod{mn}$.

Consider m = 5, n = 9, then if (a, b) = (3, 7) then $x = 43 \pmod{45}$.

Consider (a', b') = (2,4), then $x = 22 \pmod{45}$.

Now consider:

Bijection:

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Simplified Chinese Remainder Theorem:

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Consider m = 5, n = 9, then if (a, b) = (3, 7) then $x = 43 \pmod{45}$.

Consider (a', b') = (2,4), then $x = 22 \pmod{45}$.

Now consider: (a,b)+(a',b')=(0,2).

Bijection:

$$f(x) = ax \pmod{m}$$
 if $gcd(a, m) = 1$.

Simplified Chinese Remainder Theorem:

If gcd(n, m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

Bijection between $(a \pmod{n}, b \pmod{m})$ and $x \pmod{mn}$.

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Consider (a', b') = (2,4), then $x = 22 \pmod{45}$.

Now consider: (a,b)+(a',b')=(0,2).

What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

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Consider m = 5, n = 9, then if (a, b) = (3, 7) then $x = 43 \pmod{45}$.

Consider (a', b') = (2,4), then $x = 22 \pmod{45}$.

Now consider: (a,b)+(a',b')=(0,2).

What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try 43 + 22 = 65

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Consider m = 5, n = 9, then if (a, b) = (3, 7) then $x = 43 \pmod{45}$.

Consider (a', b') = (2,4), then $x = 22 \pmod{45}$.

Now consider: (a,b)+(a',b')=(0,2).

What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

Bijection:

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 if $gcd(a, m) = 1$.

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If gcd(n, m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

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Now consider: (a,b)+(a',b')=(0,2).

What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

Is it 0 (mod 5)?

Bijection:

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What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

Is it 0 (mod 5)? Yes!

Bijection:

$$f(x) = ax \pmod{m}$$
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If gcd(n, m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

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What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

Is it 0 (mod 5)? Yes! Is it 2 (mod 9)?

Bijection:

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 if $gcd(a, m) = 1$.

Simplified Chinese Remainder Theorem:

If gcd(n, m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

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What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

Is it 0 (mod 5)? Yes! Is it 2 (mod 9)? Yes!

Bijection:

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What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

Is it 0 (mod 5)? Yes! Is it 2 (mod 9)? Yes!

Isomorphism:

Bijection:

$$f(x) = ax \pmod{m}$$
 if $gcd(a, m) = 1$.

Simplified Chinese Remainder Theorem:

If gcd(n, m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

Bijection between $(a \pmod{n}, b \pmod{m})$ and $x \pmod{mn}$.

Consider m = 5, n = 9, then if (a, b) = (3, 7) then $x = 43 \pmod{45}$.

Consider (a',b') = (2,4), then $x = 22 \pmod{45}$.

Now consider: (a,b) + (a',b') = (0,2).

What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

Is it 0 (mod 5)? Yes! Is it 2 (mod 9)? Yes!

Isomorphism:

the actions under (mod 5), (mod 9)

Bijection:

$$f(x) = ax \pmod{m}$$
 if $gcd(a, m) = 1$.

Simplified Chinese Remainder Theorem:

If gcd(n, m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

Bijection between $(a \pmod{n}, b \pmod{m})$ and $x \pmod{mn}$.

Consider m = 5, n = 9, then if (a, b) = (3, 7) then $x = 43 \pmod{45}$.

Consider (a',b') = (2,4), then $x = 22 \pmod{45}$.

Now consider: (a,b) + (a',b') = (0,2).

What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

Is it 0 (mod 5)? Yes! Is it 2 (mod 9)? Yes!

Isomorphism:

the actions under (mod 5), (mod 9) correspond to actions in (mod 45)!

```
x = 5 \mod 7 and x = 5 \mod 6

y = 4 \mod 7 and y = 3 \mod 6
```

```
x = 5 \mod 7 and x = 5 \mod 6

y = 4 \mod 7 and y = 3 \mod 6
```

$$x = 5 \mod 7$$
 and $x = 5 \mod 6$
 $y = 4 \mod 7$ and $y = 3 \mod 6$

(A)
$$x + y = 2 \mod 7$$

 $x = 5 \mod 7$ and $x = 5 \mod 6$ $y = 4 \mod 7$ and $y = 3 \mod 6$

- (A) $x + y = 2 \mod 7$
- (B) $x + y = 2 \mod 6$

$$x = 5 \mod 7$$
 and $x = 5 \mod 6$
 $y = 4 \mod 7$ and $y = 3 \mod 6$

- (A) $x + y = 2 \mod 7$
- (B) $x + y = 2 \mod 6$
- (C) $xy = 3 \mod 6$

$$x = 5 \mod 7$$
 and $x = 5 \mod 6$
 $y = 4 \mod 7$ and $y = 3 \mod 6$

- (A) $x + y = 2 \mod 7$
- (B) $x + y = 2 \mod 6$
- (C) $xy = 3 \mod 6$
- (D) $xy = 6 \mod 7$

$$x = 5 \mod 7$$
 and $x = 5 \mod 6$
 $y = 4 \mod 7$ and $y = 3 \mod 6$

- (A) $x + y = 2 \mod 7$
- (B) $x + y = 2 \mod 6$
- (C) $xy = 3 \mod 6$
- (D) $xy = 6 \mod 7$
- (E) $x = 5 \mod 42$

$$x = 5 \mod 7$$
 and $x = 5 \mod 6$
 $y = 4 \mod 7$ and $y = 3 \mod 6$

- (A) $x + y = 2 \mod 7$
- (B) $x + y = 2 \mod 6$
- (C) $xy = 3 \mod 6$
- (D) $xy = 6 \mod 7$
- (E) $x = 5 \mod 42$
- (F) $y = 39 \mod 42$

$$x = 5 \mod 7$$
 and $x = 5 \mod 6$
 $y = 4 \mod 7$ and $y = 3 \mod 6$

What's true?

- (A) $x + y = 2 \mod 7$
- (B) $x + y = 2 \mod 6$
- (C) $xy = 3 \mod 6$
- (D) $xy = 6 \mod 7$
- (E) $x = 5 \mod 42$
- (F) $y = 39 \mod 42$

All true.

- 1 True
- 0 False

- 1 True
- 0 False
- $1 \lor 1 = 1$

- 1 True
- 0 False
- $1 \lor 1 = 1$
- $1 \lor 0 = 1$
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Computer Science:

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
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
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












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One-time Pad: secret s is string of length |m|.



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...given E(m,s) any message m is equally likely.

Disadvantages:

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Uses up one time pad..or less and less secure.














$$m = D(E(m, K), k)$$


Private: k


Public: K

Message m

Alice


Bob






Everyone knows key K! Bob (and Eve

Bob (and Eve and me





Everyone knows key K!Bob (and Eve and me and you

$$m = D(E(m, K), k)$$


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Message m

Eve

Everyone knows key K!Bob (and Eve and me and you and you ...) can encode.



Everyone knows key K!Bob (and Eve and me and you and you ...) can encode. Only Alice knows the secret key k for public key K.

$$m = D(E(m, K), k)$$

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Is this even possible?

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Encode every message: E(m', K). Check if Bob's: E(m, K).

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Announce $N(=p \cdot q)$ and e: K = (N, e) is my public key!

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Does $D(E(m)) = m^{ed} = m \mod N$?

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Bob has a key (N,e,d). Alice is good, Eve is evil.

(A) Eve knows e and N.

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- (A) Eve knows e and N.
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$$\begin{array}{rcl} 7(0) + 60(1) & = & 60 \\ 7(1) + 60(0) & = & 7 \end{array}$$

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$$7(0)+60(1) = 60$$

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Confirm:

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Confirm: -119 + 120 = 1

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Confirm:
$$-119 + 120 = 1$$

 $d = e^{-1} = -17 = 43 = \pmod{60}$

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Message Choices: $\{0,\dots,76\}$.

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```
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Message Choices: $\{0, \dots, 76\}$.

Message: 2!

E(2)

```
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$$E(2) = 2^e$$

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Public Key: (77,7) Message Choices: \{0,...,76\}. Message: 2! E(2) = 2^e = 2^7 \equiv 128 = 51 \pmod{77} D(51) = 51^{43} \pmod{77} uh oh!
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Public Key: (77,7) Message Choices: \{0,\ldots,76\}. Message: 2! E(2)=2^e=2^7\equiv 128=51\pmod{77} D(51)=51^{43}\pmod{77} uh oh! Obvious way: 43 multiplications. Ouch. In general, O(N) or O(2^n) multiplications!
```

Notice: 43 = 32 + 8 + 2 + 1 or 101011 in binary.

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51⁴³

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 $51^{43} = 51^{32+8+2+1}$

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Decoding got the message back!

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```

Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

1. x^y : Compute x^1 ,

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1. x^y : Compute $x^1, x^2, x^4, \dots, x^{2^{\lfloor \log y \rfloor}}$.

- 1. x^{y} : Compute $x^{1}, x^{2}, x^{4}, ..., x^{2^{\lfloor \log y \rfloor}}$.
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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$.

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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All n-bit numbers.

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 $O(n^2)$ time per multiplication.

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Conclusion: xy mod N

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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$.

All *n*-bit numbers.

Repeated Squaring:

O(n) multiplications.

 $O(n^2)$ time per multiplication.

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Conclusion: $x^y \mod N$ takes $O(n^3)$ time.

 x^y .

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y is even, y = 2k, $x^y = x^{2k} = (x^2)^k$. k = y/2

```
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y is odd, y = 2k + 1, x^y = x^{2k} = (x^2)^k. k = \lfloor y/2 \rfloor
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power (x,y) = x * \text{power } (x^{2}, \lfloor y/2 \rfloor).

Base case: x^{0} = 1.
```

RSA is pretty fast.

Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$.

Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All *n*-bit numbers. $O(n^3)$ time.

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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All n-bit numbers. $O(n^3)$ time.

$$E(m,(N,e)) = m^e \pmod{N}$$
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Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All n-bit numbers. $O(n^3)$ time.

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Remember RSA encoding/decoding!

$$E(m,(N,e)) = m^e \pmod{N}.$$

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For 512 bits, a few hundred million operations.

Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All n-bit numbers. $O(n^3)$ time.

Remember RSA encoding/decoding!

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E(m,(N,e)) = m^e \pmod{N}.

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N = pq and d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}.
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E(m,(N,e))=m^e\pmod{N}. D(m,(N,d))=m^d\pmod{N}. N=pq \text{ and } d=e^{-1}\pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}. Want:
```

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Want: (m^e)^d = m^{ed} = m \pmod{N}.
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Another view:
```

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 $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)} \iff ed = k(p-1)(q-1) + 1.$

Consider...

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Fermat's Little Theorem: For prime p, and $a \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$,

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$$\implies a^{k(p-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$

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```

Consider...

$$\implies a^{k(p-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \implies$$

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Fermat's Little Theorem: For prime p, and $a \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$,

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 $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$.

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Want: (m^e)^d=m^{ed}=m\pmod{N}.
Another view: d=e^{-1}\pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}\iff ed=k(p-1)(q-1)+1.
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Fermat's Little Theorem: For prime p, and a\not\equiv 0\pmod{p},
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Similar, not same, but useful.

Correct decoding...

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Poll

Mark what is true.

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(A) 2^7 = 1 \mod 7
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(B)
$$2^6 = 1 \mod 7$$

- (C) $2^1, 2^2, 2^3, 2^4, 2^5, 2^6, 2^7$ are distinct mod 7.
- (D) 2^{1} , 2^{2} , 2^{3} , 2^{4} , 2^{5} , 2^{6} are distinct mod 7
- (E) $2^{15} = 2 \mod 7$
- (F) $2^{15} = 1 \mod 7$

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RSA decodes correctly..

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Prime Number Theorem: $\pi(N)$ number of primes less than N.For all $N \geq 17$

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All steps are polynomial in $O(\log N)$, the number of bits.

Security?

- 1. Alice knows p and q.
- 2. Bob only knows, N(=pq), and e.

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- 3. I don't know how to break this scheme without factoring N.

No one I know or have heard of admits to knowing how to factor *N*.

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- Bob only knows, N(= pq), and e.
 Does not know, for example, d or factorization of N.
- 3. I don't know how to break this scheme without factoring N.

No one I know or have heard of admits to knowing how to factor N. Breaking in general sense \implies factoring algorithm.

How do you get Amazon's key?

How do you get Amazon's key? Browser asks Amazon!

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"Person in middle", pretending to be Amazon?

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When Amazon provides key, it provides signature from authority.

Signature can be verified by browser, since it has key.

Verisign:

Amazon Browser.

Verisign:

 $Certificate\ Authority:\ Verisign,\ GoDaddy,\ DigiNotar,...$

Verisign: k_{ν} , K_{ν}

Amazon ← Browser.

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 $[C, S_{\nu}(C)]$

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[C, S_v(C)]
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
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 $E(S_V(C), K_V)$

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$$[C,S_{v}(C)] \qquad \qquad C = E(S_{V}(C),k_{V})?$$

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Vorigina's key: $K_{-} = (N_{-})$ and $K_{-} = d(N_{-})$ and

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Valid signature of Amazon certificate C!

Security: Eve can't forge unless she "breaks" RSA scheme.

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Poll

Signature authority has public key (N,e).

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- (C) Signature of message x is $x^e \pmod{N}$
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- (D) Signature of message x is $x^d \pmod{N}$
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
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CS161...



Get CA to certify fake certificates: Microsoft Corporation.

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Public-Key Encryption.

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RSA Scheme:

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$$N = pq$$
 and $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$.

$$E(x) = x^e \pmod{N}$$
.

$$D(y) = y^d \pmod{N}$$
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